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A Criticism of a Criticism of the U. S. Supreme Court
Boyd: Geitlemen and ladies, we have taken all of the evi-
dence we care to, and while it is a little hasty, perhaps, to give my
opinion right now, I think it is just as well to tell you what I
think of it. I think this whole thing is a great big joke. I think
it is one of the finest jokes I ever saw.
Tigert: Now, I would like to ask, how many in the room
thought it was a real bona fide quarrel and trial? (Eleven declared
that they thought the trial was real.)
How many caught on to the fact that this was a hoax? (One.)
All the people that testified here, then, thought it was a bona
fide disturbance. How many were suspicious while they were tes-
tifying? (Four.) One suspected it was an experiment because he
had seen the boys in the case conferring with Judge Chalkley all
week.
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A CRITICISM OF JUDGE R. M. WANAMAKER'S
CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES.
By Kemp P. Battle, LL.D.*
Hon. R. M. Wanamaker, Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
has published a sharp criticism of the Supreme Court of the United
States. In my judgment it is full of fallacies.
The Judge lays down five propositions as embodying the con-
tention as to the right of the courts to kill a law regularly enacted
by the legislature on the ground that it is not authorized by the
Constitution. I discuss these in their order:
1. "At the time of the adoption of our Federal Constitution,
no court of any leading civilized nation of the world was then ex-
ercising such power."
The answer is plain. In 1787 there was no government like
ours. Our Government is a treaty between sovereign nations, then
13, now 48. This treaty is in writing, of course. The functions
*Ex-President and Ex-Professor of Constitutional 'Law In the University of
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of the executive, legislative and judicial departments differ from
those of all other governments. The Parliament of England in
1787 was not a body to be imitated. The woes of Ireland were
largely caused by its unwise and selfish legislation. It was this
body, corrupted by patronage and money, which, under the urgency
of King George, warred against our people and lost the United
States to England. As for the France of 1787, two years later its
debauched despotism crumbled into the bloody chaos of revohl-
tion. As for Germany, its government was so weak and disjointed
that it fell for a time under Napoleon's sway. There was no civil-
ized nation whose government was worthy to be copied by the
sagacious convention of 1787.
They avoided the evils of other governments. The powers and
duties of the new government could not be changed except by the
people themselves. Until changed, they must be obeyed, and a
tribunal was provided to prevent disobedience.
2. Judge Wanamaker's second proposition is: "Under the
common law, as adopted by us from England, Parliament, or the
law-making body, was supreme, and for two hundred years no
English court or king ever ventured to nullify any act regularly
passed by the English law-making body."
The answer is equally plain. The United States never adopted
the political law of England. The States adopted only the common
law as applicable to disputes between individuals. As Judge
Cooley, in his excellent work on the Principles of Constitutional
Law, says, "Each of the several States had a common law of its
own, derived in the case of most of them from the common law of
England, but modified more or less in adoption by circumstances,
usage or status. But the United States as such can have no com-
mon law. It derives its powers from the grant of the people made
lty the Constitution, and they are all to be found in the written law,
and nowhere else." The common law has no more relation to our
Federal Constitution than the Code of Justinian or the Levitical
Law.
3. The Judge's third proposition is: "Our Federal Consti-
tution expressly declares that it is a document of delegated powerq,
and that the powers not delegated are reserved to the people and
the States, whether these powers be legislative, executive or judicial."
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I assent to this. The Judge concedes that Congress has no
powers other than those delegated to it, expressly or impliedly.
4. The fourth proposition is clearly and totally wrong. It
is said: "There is no express delegation of such power to courts
anywhere in our Federal Constitution, and no one has so contended;
even the learned Marshall in his celebrated decision of Marbury
versuis Madison, is significant in the fact that he points out no ar-
ticle, section or provision of the Constitution which delegates any
such power to the Supreme Court of the United States."
The Judge also declares that the Constitution does not give
the Judiciary "the right to kill a law regularly enacted by the
legislature." The expression is ambiguous. If he means by the
words "regularly enacted," that Congress had the right to pass
it, I will not dispute the assertion. But he evidently means that the
Supreme Court cannot kill an alleged law because it is unconsti-
tutional in their opinion. I am sure that this power and duty are
so clearly in the Constitution that "he who runs may read." Let
us go to the Constitution.
In Art. VI., Paragraph 2, we read: "The Constitution, and
the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or-which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land." That is, if acts of Congress are in pursuance of the Con-
stitution,, they are laws. If not in pursuance of the Constitution,
they are not laws. They are void and of no effect.
The Constitution enumerates in eighteen paragraphs what
power of legislation is conferred on Congress. Acts to carry out
these powers are in pursuance of the Constitution. And then are
enumerated the classes of laws which they are forbidden to pass,
in eight paragraphs. If any of these forbidden laws are passed
they are of course not "in -pursuance of the Constitution." They
are but waste paper. The same law holds as to other powers al-
lowed or prohibited in the Constitution and amendments thereto.
Now let us see if there is provision in the Constitution for pre-
venting acts passed not in pursuance thereof, from going into effect.
According to the new doctrine a majority of Congress, the Presi-
dent concurring, or two-thirds without the President, has for two
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years despotic powers. In other words, that the sages of 1787
copied after their corrupt enemy the Parliament of England, and
provided no means of checking unlawful legislation. See what this
leads to. Congress can pass acts to arrest without warrant in times
of peace, pass bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, levy taxes
not allowed by the Constitution, levy export duties, give favored
harbors exclusive privileges, draw money from the treasury without
accounting for it, grant titles of nobility, line their purses and the
purses of their co-robbers with foreign money, and this unlawful
legislation must be binding, at least until the next Congress. ft
is a fearful doctrine. Such an autocratic Congress could control
elections in their own interests. They could force the re-election
of themselves and their partisans, and the two years' tyranny might
last indefinitely, or, which is more likely, provoke a frightful civil
war. Let us not sneer at these possibilities as fanciful. We should
not forget the history of the Parliaments of Charles I. and of
Cromwell, and the turbulent legislatures of the French Revolution.
Is it possible that the extremely able men of 1787 could not
foresee the dangers of creating a legislature with powers unchecked
for two years? It is incredible that they should frame a govern.
ment of successive biennial despotisms; that, for example, Norrh
Carolina or Virginia should concede to the delegates of M1assachu-
setts or New York, combining with delegates from other States,
biennial unrestrained control over their rights of persons and
property.
They did not adopt a government, a Constitution, so devoid- of
political wisdom. They provided for a Supreme Court, composed
of judges selected by the people's President, and approved by the
people's Senators, eminent for wisdom, from all the States, to hold
office during good behavior and secure as to their livelihood. They
entrusted to this great tribunal the power and duty of guarding
their Constitution from the ill-advised attacks or mistakes of Presi-
dents, Governors, National and State judges and legislatures. It
is asserted that "no article, section or provision of the Constitution
delegates any such power to the Supreme Court of the United
States." I deny this. The creation of the court carries the power.
What is a court? Judge Cooley well describes it: "The business
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of the courts is to apply the law of the land in such. controversies
as may be brought before them, to decide the true meaning of the
law, and whether it was rightfully enacted." What is the "law of
the land," which is placed under the guardianship of the court?
1st, above all, the Constitution. 2nd, laws- in pursuance of -the
Constitution. 3rd, treaties under the authority of the United
States. The people have declared what is the supreme law. They
establish a supreme court to apply this law in controversies brought
before it, How is it possible to apply the law without interpreting
it, and declaring its meaning? Suppose Congress passes an act au-
thorizing an officer to seize the land of A without compensation,
and the officer seizes and sells to B. A brings suiit against B, who
relies on the act of Congress. A replies that the act was not in
pursuance of the Constitution, and therefore is not law. How cau
the court evade deciding in his favor? Shall it, cravenly say, B
has A's land, but we dare not say so, lest we offend the august
Congress? Shall the court say, "It is true that our duty is to
protect A, but he must wait until after the next election and pos-
sibly another Congress will do him justice?"
This brings us to Judge Wanamaker's fifthly:
5. "The question of a supervisory board or council of re-
vision to pass on the constitutionality of acts Gf our National Con-
gress. was four times before the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
Said council was to be composed of the President and a number
of Judges of the Supreme Court. Each time the suggestion was
made to create such a supervisory body the same was overwhelm-
ingly voted down."
Of course, the proposition was voted down. The convention
preferred to entrust the power to the Supreme Court.
The ease of Marbury vs. Madison decided that Marbury was
entitled to his commission. It was this that chiefly offended Jeffer-
son and Madison. They and their followers contended that the
decision was "not only wrong, but unnecessary, because the court
further decided that Congress had no power under the Constita-
tion to give the right to a mandamus in the Court of the District of
.Columbia.. Marbury was non-suited. Dana in his7 work on the
Constitution says that "this second decision has met with universal
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acquiescence." Our judges generally, National and State, and our
able statesmen for over a hundred years, and the erudite commen-
tators, Kent, Story, Duer, Toequeville, Dana, Cooley, Wharton,
our trusted historians, eminent lawyers, all thoughtful men, have
concurred in the doctrine that Congress is not supreme and the
court must not sustain its acts when unlawful.
And the people have endorsed the decision. *Whenever a de-
cision of the court was against the popular will, it has been changed
by constitutional amendment.
But no cavalier has had the temerity to advocate an amend-
ment like the following: "Article VI, paragraph 2, shall be
amended by adding after the words 'law of the land,' the follow-
"ing, 'but acts of Congress not in pursuance of the Constitution shall
be binding on the courts until modified or repealed by Congress.'
It seems strange that a critic of the courts should hold up
"five hundred slaughtered statutes," as a reproach to the court.
The censure should rather be on the carelessness of the legislatures.
The courts should be praised not blamed for their vigilance and
firmness.
The Judge contends that in the 14th amendment, the words,
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of the law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws," do not protect corporations.
The infringement of the rights of all persons, whites, blacks, yel-
lows, copper-colored, is forbidden by this amendment to the States,
as they were already forbidden to the United States. But the
Judge contends that corporations are not included in the words
"persons.'' "The paramount purpose of the amendment, unmis-
takably ard without the shadow of a doubt, demonstrates that in
using the word 'person,' the framer and adopters intended to mean
a human being and nothing else." Certainly the word "persons,"
,does not 'mean monkeys, nor horses, nor asses, but men, women
and children. But a corporation is but the human beings who com-
pose it. The law allows those human beings to do business under
one name with other privileges, but the owners, partners, or stock-
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holders, as we call them, are the corporation, and equally protected
by the amendment.
Another thing,, the enemies of corporations ignore the fact
that many of the persons who do business under a corporate name,
are as much entitled to our sympathy, as the laborers, for whom so
much pity is exhibited. Some have scanty means, perhaps -their
share in the corporation is all they have. The 14th amendment
protects them from robbery by excessive taxation or otherwise, as
well as the owners of land and other property.
Judge Wanamaker contends that the 14th amendment was
chiefly designed to protect negroes. Taking this erroneous, limited.
view, suppose a hundred negroes engage in partnership and find it
convenient to use one name and become incorporated. Do they
lose their benefits of the amendment? They are negroes still. They
will not be allowed to be plundered by State legislation.
It is unfortunate that people have been wrongly taught that
corporations are not the human beings that own them, that they
are not men and women, but monsters to be dreaded. The grand
inventions and machinery of modern civilization could not have
been created without them. If they break the law, let us punish
them, the punishment falling on the human beings who own them,
or their agents. If they are law-abiding, treat them fairly as other
persons, white or colored.
For the refusal of the Supreme Court to carry into effect acts
of Congress not. in pursuance of the Constitution, this eminent tri-
bunal is accused of having usurped despotic powers. The charge
is not only unfounded, but impossible. If the people desire it,
constitutional changes can be, as they have been, adopted. Con-
gress has much control over court procedure. The consideration of
a case (MeArdle's) was once averted by repealing the right of
appeal. President Grant and Congress co-operating reversed the
decision in the Greenback case. President Jackson declined to
release by force Worcester from a Georgia prison, as the removal
.of the Cherokees west of the Mississippi settled the controversy.
Chief Justice Taney failed to deliver Merrimon from Fort McHenry
even before martial law was proclaimed. The court was of the
opinion that the Constitution as originally worded did not authorize
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the passage of a certain act taxing incomes. The people by amend-
ment speedily gage Congress the desired power., By the 11th
amendment a State cannot be sued by a citizen, although the text
of the Constitution seemed to allow it. After the seats of the present
justices are vacated, Congress can fix salaries so small that able
lawyers will not accept the seats on the bench. The evil of a weak
and unlearned judiciary cannot be conceived. Jefferson had a
strong dislike of all Federalists, especially of Chief Justice Mar-
shall; yet, although his party was dominant in the Union, he made
no move to procure an amendment to give Congress supreme bien-
nial power, by forbidding the court to question its unlawful acts.
The truth is that the court is more likely to lose its relative weight
as designed by the framers of the Constitution, than ambitiously
to reach out to grasp ungranted power.
There appears to be a concerted effort to make the court
odious, by describing it as a tyrant aiming to deprive people of
theif liberties. Why accuse the judges of being the agents of a
terrific unseen monster called "interests"? Some of these detrac-
tors doubtless are working for the election of judges by the people,
a fantastic idea considering the wide extent of the United States,
and the impossibility of the people of one State knowing the quali-
fications of lawyers in distant regions. Others would require a
unanimous vote of the judges, thus placing the decision in the power
of a crank, or of one bribed by an interested party. If a majority
of judges chosen from the ablest and best lawyers of the land, with
the eyes of the Nation upon them, agree that a proposed law is not
authorized by the Constitution, out of respect for that most sacred
instrument, let us acquiesce in their verdict. The presumption is
that they are right. If occasionally their judgments, for the good
ol the Nation, ought to be reversed, let it be done in an orderly
way. Let us not .endeavor to drag down the Supreme Court from
the lofty position it holds in the estimation of thoughtful political
students throughout the civilized -world.
